Pavlo Skoropadskyi

gigatos | June 12, 2022

Summary

Pavel Skoropadsky (pre-Ref. Pavel Skoropadsky, Ukr. Pavlo Petrovych Skoropadskyi (May 3, 1873, Wiesbaden, Germany – April 26, 1945, Metten, Bavaria, Germany) – Lieutenant-General of the Russian Imperial Army, after the Revolution of 1917 – the Ukrainian military and political figure, Hetman of All Ukraine from 29 April to 14 December 1918.

From hereditary noblemen of Poltava province of the Skoropadsky family, to which belonged Ivan Skoropadsky, hetman of the Zaporozhsky Host. He was of Orthodox Christianity. A major landowner of Poltava and Chernigov provinces.

He was the son of Peter Ivanovich Skoropadsky (1834-1885), retired Colonel of Horse Guards Regiment, Starodubsky District Prelate of the Nobility, and his wife Maria Andreevna (1839-1900), the daughter of porcelain manufacturer A. M. Miklashevsky. He was the grandson of Ivan Mikhailovich Skoropadsky (1805-1887), a rich landowner and philanthropist of Priluki, the leader of the nobility, court counselor.

He lived with his mother and relatives in Wiesbaden (Germany) until the age of five, then – on his family estate in Ukraine, in Trostyanets. At the age of twelve he was left without a father.

He studied at the gymnasium in Starodub. In 1886 he entered the Corps of Pages in St. Petersburg. In 1891 he was transferred to the junior special class. On October 13, 1892 he was made a chamberlain.

Russian officer

After graduating from the first class of the course of science in the Corps of Pages, August 7, 1893 made cornet and assigned to the Life Guards Cavalry Regiment.

On December 1, 1896 he was appointed regimental adjutant, and on April 17, 1897 was also appointed head of the regimental school for soldiers” children. In 1897 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel of the Guards, in 1901, for length of service – to staff-sergeant of the Guards (with seniority from 07.08.1901).

Participant in the Russian-Japanese War. On March 7, 1904 with the beginning of the war was dismissed from his post of regimental adjutant and on March 15 was transferred to the 3rd Verkhneudinskij regiment of Transbaikalia Cossack Army, with the change of name to lieutenant colonel. Upon arrival in the theater of military operations, on May 1, 1904 was appointed adjutant to the chief of the Eastern detachment, Count Keller, and after his death was in charge of a hundred soldiers of the 2nd Chita Cossack Regiment. In June 1905 he was appointed Adjutant to General N. P. Linevich, Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Naval Forces, acting against Japan, with the rank of Captain and with enlistment in the army cavalry.

He was awarded five orders, including the Order of St. Anna, 4th Class, with the inscription “For Bravery,” and the Golden Gun with the inscription “For Bravery.

At the end of the war, on November 25, 1905, he was transferred back to the cavalry guard with the former rank of staff sergeant of the Guard. On 9 December 1905 he was appointed Adjutant to His Imperial Majesty. On 19 December 1905 he was appointed commander of the Life Squadron of the Cavalry Guards Regiment.

On January 14, 1906, for length of service, was promoted to captain of the guard, on December 6, 1906 – from captains to colonels (for the vacancy).

In 1908, in St. Petersburg, he graduated (with honors) from the Officer Cavalry School.

On September 4, 1910 he was appointed commander of the 20th Dragoon Finnish Regiment, remaining adjutant-adjutant.

On April 15, 1911 he was appointed commander of the Horse Regiment of the Life Guards, and remained adjutant, and on March 25, 1912 was promoted to major general, with approval in the office and enrolled in the suite of His Imperial Majesty.

World War I

He participated in World War I. He joined the war as a commander of the Leyb-Guards Cavalry Regiment. He participated in the campaign to East Prussia. He was awarded the Order of Saint George, 4th class.

On October 3, 1914 he was appointed commander of the 1st Brigade of the 1st Guards Cavalry Division. In the same year he commanded the Composite Cavalry Division, which included the 1st Brigade of the 1st Guards Cavalry Division, a battery of the Horse Artillery Lifeguard and the Crimean Cavalry Regiment.

On July 29, 1915 he was appointed commander of the 5th Cavalry Division and retained in His Majesty”s retinue, and on January 1, 1916, for differences in actions against the enemy, was promoted to lieutenant-general. On April 2, 1916 he was appointed Chief of the 1st Guards Cavalry Division, and on January 22, 1917 – Commander of the 34th Army Corps.

After the overall failure of the June (1917) offensive of the Russian army and the subsequent Tarnopol breakthrough of the Austro-German forces, the commander of the 8th Army, General L. G. Kornilov, who managed to hold the front in a difficult situation, was appointed commander of the armies of the Southwestern Front on July 7, 1917, and took the highest post – was appointed commander-in-chief. Before accepting this post, he stipulated the conditions under which he would agree to do so – one of these conditions was the implementation of the program of reorganization of the Russian Republican Army.

In August 1917, by order of L. G. Kornilov, Skoropadsky began “Ukrainization” of his corps in order to improve the combat effectiveness of the troops. The corps was transferred to the Mejibozh area for re-forming. Russian soldiers and officers were transferred to the 41st Army Corps, and in their place Ukrainian soldiers and officers were taken from other military units.

Upon completion of Ukrainianization, the 34th Army Corps was renamed the 1st Ukrainian Corps (of the Russian Republican Army), which Skoropadsky continued to command.

October-December 1917

In October 1917, after the Bolsheviks came to power, Skoropadsky recognized the authority of the Ukrainian Central Rada, although the socialist ideas of its leaders seemed alien and unacceptable to him.

In November-December 1917, Skoropadsky”s 1st Ukrainian Corps implemented a plan developed by Corps Chief of Staff Gen. V. Safonov”s plan to neutralize the “Bolshevized” Russian Army units moving by railroad from the front to the central provinces of Soviet Russia through Kiev and threatening the liquidation of the Central Rada and the Ukrainian People”s Republic (UNR). Units of the corps occupied strategically important railroad stations-Vinnitsa, Zhmerinka, Kazatin, Berdichev, Bila Tserkov, and Fastov-and blocked the Bolsheviks” route to Kiev from the south. “Red” echelons were intercepted, disarmed, and sent to Soviet Russia bypassing Kiev.

General Skoropadsky was appointed commander of all UNR troops on the Right Bank of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the leadership of the Central Rada and the NRA continued to view Skoropadsky with prejudice, viewing him as a future rival for power and not believing that the aristocrat and one of the wealthiest men of the former empire could sincerely defend the interests of the NRA. The growing popularity of Skoropadsky, who was elected ataman general by the All-Ukrainian Congress of the Free Cossacks in Chiguirin on October 6, 1917, also aggravated relations with the Central Rada. This was a manifestation of special trust and respect and indicated great authority among the masses. The growing popularity of the talented general, the dignity and independence with which he held himself, and especially his aristocratic and material well-being, irritated the top of the NRA, who openly accused him of Bonapartist intentions.

After Semyon Petlyura was dismissed from the post of Secretary General of Military Affairs and Nikolai Portia was appointed in his place, Skoropadsky”s relations with the leaders of the UCR deteriorated definitively. The combat general, noted for the highest military decorations, could not understand why the actual problems of the army organization were being solved by a man who had never had anything to do with it.

All Skoropadsky”s efforts to prove the necessity of a Ukrainian regular army were in vain. Skoropadsky”s corps on the eve of winter found itself without food, winter clothes and shoes. This attitude demoralized the soldiers, and they began to go home. Under constant pressure from the leadership of the Central Rada, General Skoropadsky was forced to resign on the eve of 1918 from his post of Commander in Chief of the Central Rada. At the same time he resigned his position as commander of the 1st Ukrainian Corps. With Skoropadsky”s resignation as commander-in-chief, the Ukrainian army virtually collapsed.

In Opposition to the Central Rada

Shortly after the occupation troops entered Ukraine and the Central Rada regained power, a right-wing political organization, the Ukrainian People”s Hramada (UNH), emerged in Kiev, uniting large landowners and former military officers in its ranks. A large part of the UNG members were petty officers of the 1st Ukrainian Corps and Cossacks of the Free Cossacks, and it was headed by Pavlo Skoropadsky. The UNG established close relations with the Ukrainian Democratic and Bread Producers Party and the Union of Land Owners. The UNG leadership set out to bring about a change in government policy. In this they were supported by the command of the German and Austro-Hungarian forces, disappointed by the inability of the UNR government to provide food exports to Germany and Austria-Hungary.

By this time, the Central Rada”s policy of radical reform led to an aggravation of agrarian contradictions. The land law adopted by the Central Rada back in January 1918, based on the principle of communalization of land, did not help to stabilize the political situation in the country because it not only inflamed revolutionary passions among the poor peasantry, encouraging them to pogrom the landowners” estates, but also set large landowners and wealthy peasants against the government.

In mid-April, German representatives held talks with a number of potential candidates for the post of head of Ukraine. The final choice was Pavel Skoropadsky. On April 28, 1918, the German military dispersed the Central Rada. A group of key ministers of the government was sent to Lukyanovsky prison.

Hetman of the Ukrainian State

On April 29, 1918 at the All-Ukrainian Congress of Grain Growers (landlords and large peasant owners, about 6,500 delegates) Skoropadsky was proclaimed hetman of all Ukraine.

The coup d”état with the assertion of the Hetman”s authority was carried out almost bloodlessly. On the night of April 30, all the most important government agencies were placed under the control of the Hetmans. A “Letter to all the Ukrainian people” signed by the hetman was distributed in Kiev, stating that the authority of the head of state was transferred to “the hetman of all Ukraine” Skoropadsky, renaming the UNR into Ukrainian State, forming the executive body of Ukrainian State – the Council of Ministers, restoring “the right of private property as the foundation of culture and civilization”, declaring freedom to buy and sell land.

Laws on the Provisional State Structure of Ukraine” were adopted, according to which the Hetman, who had broad powers in all spheres, appointed “Otaman” (Chairman of the Council of Ministers), approved the composition of the government and dismissed it, was the highest official in foreign affairs, the supreme military leader, had the right to declare amnesty as well as martial or special state.

Hetman liquidated the Central Rada and its institutions, land committees, abolished the republic and all revolutionary reforms. Henceforth the UNR was transformed into a Ukrainian state with a semi-monarchical authoritarian rule of the Hetman – the supreme head of state, army and judicial power in the country.

Skoropadsky relied in his activities on the old bureaucracy and officers, large landowners (the Ukrainian Democratic and Grain Party and the Union of Landowners) and the bourgeoisie (“Protofis” – the Union of Representatives of Industry, Trade, Finance, and Agriculture).

On May 3, a cabinet of ministers was formed, headed by Prime Minister F. A. Lizogub, a major landowner and chairman of the Poltava provincial zemstvo. Most ministerial positions were taken by the cadets, who supported the hetman”s regime.

By May 10, delegates to the Second All-Ukrainian Peasant Congress were arrested, and the congress itself was broken up. The delegates who remained at large called upon the peasants to fight against Skoropadsky. The First All-Ukrainian Conference of Trade Unions also issued a resolution against the hetman.

Ukraine”s socialist parties refused to cooperate with the new regime. After Ukrainian SR Dmytro Doroshenko agreed to take the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, the newspaper Novaya Rada reported on his expulsion from the party. The Hetman forbade the convening of party congresses of the USDLP and the UPSR, but they secretly met and issued anti-Hetman resolutions. Zemstvo became the center of legal opposition to the Hetman regime.

May 1918 was marked by the beginning of the peasant war, which soon engulfed the entire territory of Ukraine. On June 3, at the call of the Ukrainian Social Revolutionaries, an uprising broke out in the Zvenigorod and Taraschansk districts of Kiev province. In August and September the German and Hetman”s troops barely managed to suppress the Zvenigorod-Taraschans uprising, but it spread to new regions-Poltava, Chernigov, Ekaterinoslav and Northern Tavria.

At the end of May the center of legal opposition to the hetman”s rule was formed – the Ukrainian National-State Union (with the participation of the Ukrainian Democratic-Hlebner”s Party, the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists, the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Self-Determinists and the Ukrainian Labor Party), Initially limited to moderate criticism of the regime and the government, but since August, after joining the Union of Left Socialists and its renaming into the Ukrainian National Union (UNS), this organization began to turn increasingly radical.

Beginning in late June, the German command demanded that the Hetman make broad arrests of opposition and Entente agents. On July 27, former members of the Central Rada, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Volodymyr Vinnichenko, Mykola Porsh, and Semyon Petlyura, were detained and arrested. On July 30, 1918, in Kiev, a group of Russian leftist Social Revolutionaries killed the commander of the German Army Group in Ukraine, Field Marshal General von Eichhorn and his aide-de-camp.

In the economic and social sphere the Skoropadsky government abolished all socialist transformations: the length of the working day in industrial enterprises was increased to 12 hours, strikes and strikes were prohibited.

The State and Land Banks were established, and the railroads were restored.

The crisis tendencies in industry, which had manifested themselves in late 1917 – early 1918, persisted. A serious threat was posed by the strike movement and the confrontation between trade unions and industrialists” organizations.

The land law of the Central Rada of January 31, 1918 was abolished, land commissions were created, including the Higher Land Commission chaired by Skoropadsky (October 1918) to resolve land disputes and develop a draft for land reform.

Large landed estates were restored, peasant ownership of land was confirmed with the allotment and sale of communal land, which should have contributed to the formation of a broad class of medium-sized landowners. In his memoirs, Pavel Skoropadsky cites a number of aspects that outlined the physical framework of the agrarian reform, such as:

Pavel Petrovich”s conclusions and reflections, in which he justified his planned agrarian reform and linked it to the investment climate and inflationary processes in the country:

The state bread monopoly was maintained. Hetman Skoropadsky himself was against it, but, as he recalled, this monopoly was imposed on him by the Germans. A considerable part of the harvest gathered by the peasants was subject to requisitioning, and a prodnaz (to fulfill Ukraine”s obligations to Germany and Austria-Hungary under the Brest Peace Treaty) was introduced.

Skoropadsky”s governments placed their bets on the restoration of the large landowners” and middle-class farms, which the German-Austrian occupation authorities were also interested in. Supporting the Hetman, the landowners argued that small peasant farms were unable to provide large-scale commercial agricultural production, as was demanded of Ukraine by war-torn Germany and Austria-Hungary. The latter, in turn, were unable to fulfill their obligations to supply industrial goods and agricultural implements to Ukraine. These circumstances exacerbated the already tense political and socio-economic situation in Ukrainian society, and the repressive actions of the Hetman”s punitive detachments provoked the population to armed resistance.

On July 24, 1918 the Rada of Ministers of the Ukrainian Power passed a law on universal military conscription and approved the plan for the organization of the army prepared by the General Staff. The peacetime army was planned to number more than 300,000, while the actual number of armed forces in November 1918 was about 60,000. The infantry and cavalry regiments of the Army of the Ukrainian Power were cadre regiments of the former Russian Imperial Army, stationed before 1914 in Ukraine and “Ukrainianized” in 1917, ¾ of which were headed by their former commanders. All positions in the Hetman”s army were held by Russian officers and generals of the Revolutionary Army of Free Russia (the former Russian Imperial Army) liquidated by the Bolsheviks. Some of them were Ukrainians, many were natives of Ukraine or had served here but were not Ukrainians by nationality.

In Ukraine, with the permission of the authorities, Russian volunteer organizations were actively forming and operating, speaking out against the Bolsheviks but “for a united and indivisible Russia. By the summer of 1918, Ukraine and especially Kiev represented an “island of stability” and became a center of attraction for all those fleeing from the Bolsheviks in Petrograd, Moscow and other regions of the Russian Empire.

Under Skoropadsky, Ukraine pursued a policy of soft support for the Ukrainian national-cultural revival: the opening of new Ukrainian grammar schools, the introduction of the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian history and Ukrainian geography as compulsory subjects in school. There were created Ukrainian state universities in Kiev and Kamyanets-Podolsky, History and Philology Faculty in Poltava, State Ukrainian Archives, National Art Gallery, Ukrainian History Museum, National Library of Ukrainian State, Ukrainian Drama and Opera Theater, Ukrainian State Choir, Ukrainian Symphony Orchestra, Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

In the fall of 1918, as the defeat of the Central Powers in the war was clearly approaching, Skoropadsky began to maneuver and seek ways to retain power and forge an alliance with the Entente. The Hetman invited the National Union to negotiate the formation of a new government of “national confidence.” On October 24, a new cabinet was finally formed, in which the National Union, however, received only four portfolios and declared that it would remain in opposition to the hetman”s regime.

On November 14, 1918, a few days after the news of the Armistice of Compyon, Hetman Skoropadsky signed the “Gramota,” a manifesto in which he declared that he would defend “the long-standing might and strength of the All-Russian Power” and called for the construction of an All-Russian Federation as the first step toward the re-creation of a great Russia. The Manifesto signaled the collapse of all efforts by the Ukrainian national movement to create an independent Ukrainian statehood. This document permanently alienated from the Hetman the greater part of the Ukrainian federalists, the Ukrainian military and intelligentsia. An anti-Hetman rebellion led by the Directorate of the Ukrainian People”s Republic (UNR) unfolded in Ukraine. Within a month, under the command of Semen Petlyura, the Hetman regime was overthrown by the insurgents and Hetman troops who defected to the side of the Directory. On December 14, 1918 Skoropadsky signed the manifesto on abdication of power and emigrated from Kiev together with withdrawing German troops (which is described in detail in the novel “The White Guard”).

Further fate

He lived in Germany as a private citizen at Berlin-Wansee, Alsenstrasse 17. The German authorities gave him a pension of 10,000 marks a year and in 1926-1927 allocated 45,000 marks to cover his debts.

He founded the magazine The Nation in the Campaign (1939-1941).

During World War II, he refused an offer from the Nazis to cooperate with them.

In April 1945, during the evacuation, he was mortally wounded by an Anglo-American bombing of Platling Station near Regensburg. He died a few days later in the hospital of the Metten Monastery and was buried there, then reburied in Oberstdorf, Bavaria.

Skoropadsky P. P.. Memories. End of 1917 – December 1918 = (Ukr.) Pavlo Skoropadsky. Reminiscences. End of 1917 – December 1918.

medals:

Foreign awards:

Sources

  1. Скоропадский, Павел Петрович
  2. Pavlo Skoropadskyi
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